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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------M. ELAINE BROWN,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 15,638

WENDELL V. MILLER,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff sued the defendant on a
promissory note, and the defendant counterclaimed to
have the entire transaction set aside and his down
payment returned to him;
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court.

The Court

found in favor of the plaintiff on her Complaint and dismissed the defendant's Counterclaim, no cause of action,
from which rulings the defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the decisions of the
Trial Court sustained and the defendant's appeal dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

In April, 1977, the parties entered into an
Agreement whereby the defendant agreed to purchase a
restaurant supply business, then known as L. D.'s Fine
Foods, from the plaintiff for $7,500.00.
The defendant, Mr. Miller, paid the sales price b;
paying to the plaintiff $3, 750. 00 in cash and by executing
and delivering to the plaintiff a promissory note in the
amount of $3,750.00.

The minor corrections currently

appearing on the face of the Promissory Note were made subsequent to execution and delivery of the note at the request
of Mr. Miller and with his consent.
Thereafter, the defendant made no payments on the
note and the plaintiff filed her Complaint to recover the
amount thereof together with attorney's fees and costs. Tr.;
defendant answered, admitting that he signed and delivered
the subject promissory note and that he had made no payments pursuant to the terms thereof; defendant raised the
affirmative defense of misrepresentation.
In addition, the defendant counterclaimed, demano·,
ing judgment in the amount of the initial cash payment of
$3,750.00 and for a declaration that the subject promissori
note was null and void, the grounds therefore apparently
being, duress and lack of consideration.
At trial, the defendant assumed the responsibiL·
to go forward.

(T-2).
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The defendant put forward at trial little or no
competent evidence on this issue of misrepresentation and
duress.

For example, the defendant admitted twice that

neither the plaintiff nor any of her representatives made
any untrue statement with respect to the business with which
the plaintiff dealt in the Price, Utah area.

Similarly,

the only apparent reference to duress are Mr. Miller's
statements that a Mr. Chiever, the real estate agent, was
in a rush to finish up the closing and the the promissory
note signed so that he (Mr. Chiever) could go to his mother's
funeral.

Consistent therewith, the appellant's brief deals

only with the defense of lack of consideration, and accordingly,
the scope of this brief will be restricted to that issue.
With respect to consideration, the record discloses the following:

The plaintiff had developed a business

called L. D.'s Fine Foods, which operated in the area of
Price, Utah.

The plaintiff had developed a business relation-

ship with approximately 20 businesses in the Price area.

Mrs.

Brown periodically called on each of the businesses where as
often as possible, she received an order for food products
and other restaurant supplies.

Thereafter, Mrs. Brown would

purchase the ordered items from local supply houses and
deliver the same to her customers and receive payment either
in cash or by a later billing.
When Mr. Miller agreed to purchase the distribution business, Mrs. Brown took him with her on her rounds,
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where she taught him the route and taught him where she
purchased her supplies and taught him the customary method
by which she billed her customers.

She identified for fu

Miller all of her customers, she took him into the various
businesses and introduced him to the managers thereof as
the new owner of her business, she gave him the name
L. D. 's Fine Foods, but advised him not to use the name,
(for which advice he was unhappy) , and, she terminated her
business relationship with her customers.
Mr. Miller now operates the business on a part-ti:
basis and apparently realizes less profit than Mrs. Brownd:
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
HAD GIVEN ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION
TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The record shows that the respondent transferred·
to the appellant, as consideration, an on-going and continuing business, in its entirety.

The respondent had

established a food distribution business called "L. D. 's
Fine Foods."

As part of the sale thereof to the appellant,

the respondent identified all of her customers (approximat€.
20 in number) to the appellant, and introduced the appellar!
to them as owner of the business.

The respondent spent

two days with the appellant taking the appellant to the
various businesses, introducing him and teaching him t~
.
ceedures
route she customarily followed and the various pro
used in the business.

In addition, she introduced the
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appellant to a major wholesaler of the business and she gave
him general advice on operation of the business and use of
the business name which she also transferred to him. The
respondent thereafter terminated her business relationship
with her customers in favor of the appellant.
The respondent concurs with Point I of the appellant's
brief which, as applied to this case, is to the effect that
the respondent must give adequate consideration to the
appellant.

However, the burden of showing the respondent's

failure to give adequate consideration is the affirmative
burden of the appellant where, as here, the appellant stipulated
at trial to the prima facie case of the respondent.

General

Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation,
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976).
To the foregoing principle,

(that the respondent

must give adequate'consideration, with proof of her failure
to do so being the burden of the appellant) the respondent
adds the following two general points:
The first point is stated in 17 Arn Jur 2d,
Contracts § 102:
It is fundamental that adult persons suffering
from no disabilities have complete freedom of
contract, and ordinarily the courts will not
inquire into the adequacy of the consideration
for their contracts • . • . The legal sufficiency
of a consideration for a promise does not
depend upon the comparative economic value
of the consideration and of what is promised
in return.
In other words, the relative
values of a promise and the consideration
for it do not affect the sufficiency of the
consideration and whatever consideration a
promiser assents to as the price of his promise
is legally sufficient.
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The second point is stated in Jackson v.
Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d Bl, 415 P. 2d 667 (1966)
which is a leading case dealing with contracts
and so called "good will":
This court has consistantly held in this type
of a case it reviews questions of facts most
favorable to the findings of the trial court,
and traverses only if the evidence or lack of
it renders it clearly necessary to do so.
Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at 672.
Following all of the foregoing principles, the
trial court correctly declined to substitute its judgment
for the consideration bargined for by the parties.

The

court further correctly granted judgment to the plaintiffrespondent on the record herein which shows that the defend<
appellant stipulated that the plaintiff-respondent had
established her prima facie case; which record also shows,
after the defendant's case was completed, that the plaintifi
had transferred to the defendant a continuing business in
its entirety.
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO RULE THAT
THE SALE OF A CONTINUING BUSINESS,
IN ITS ENTIRETY, CONSTITUTES LACK
OF CONSIDERATION.
The Court correctly ruled that the case law cited
by the appellant is not pursuasive on the record that the
sale by the respondent of a continuing business, in its
entirety, which had been previously established as a sole
propri tership under an assumed name, which was transferred
ff·ic1en
·
t
·
·
as part o f t h e sa 1 e, is
insu

to stand as considerat:

for the transaction between the parties.
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We refer specifically to the Utah cases of
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d Bl, 415 P.2d 667 (1966)
and Vercimak v. Ostoich, llU Utah 253, 221 P.2d 602 (1950),
which are generally consistant with case law from other
jurisdictions on this subject.

Like many other cases, these

involve disputes rising out of the dissolution of professional
partnerships which are held in Utah to have no independent
good will.

Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at Page 670.
The Utah Supreme Court in Jackson v. Caldwell

noted that "good will" as it is variously defined,
property,

(1) is

(2) can be bargained and sold, and (3) cannot be

sold separately from property rights to which it is an
incident. Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at Page 670.
In the present case the Court was correct in its
handling of the legal issues relating to good will as the
same have been stated in Jackson v. Caldwell, supra.

The

Court was correct because the respondent sold her business
in its entirety to the appellant and she ceased engaging in
that business herself.

Thus, all things whether tangable or

intangable to which the good will in L. D.'s Fine Foods had
attached passed totally to the appellant.
The language from Jackson v. Caldwell, supra, that
good will cannot be disposed of separately from property
rights to which it is an incident, is footnoted to the
Alabama case of Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So.2d 240
(Alabama 1940).

The relevant quotation in Yost v. Patrick

is a quotation from 38 C.J.S. "Good Will."
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Examining the article on good will in Title
38 C .J .S. reveals the following at Section 8 thereof under
the title "Sale in Connection with Property to Which Incidec
Good will, being always incident to some particu;,
place, name, property, or business to which it ·
inseparably adhears, can be sold, assigned, or
otherwise transferred only in connection with a
transfer o~ the thing to which it is incident, see
supra Section 3.

If the property, business, or right to which a
good will adhears is sold or otherwise transfem:
the good will, although not specifically menti~~
passes to the transferree as an incident theu~.
(emphasis added)
That good will must pass together with the propert
business, or the right to which it adhears, appears to be a
well settled requirement.

The appellant's position that

good will can only be transferred when it is attached
some form of tangible property, is not correct.

~

Good will

may just as well apply to a business or a right which are
not themselves tangible.
In the present case, the Court was correct in its vie•·
that the plaintiff-respondent had effectively transferr~~
the defendant-appellant the fruits of her work and enterpr:'
which together with the training that she supplied and the
good will she had developed constitutes sufficient consi~

0

This court properly should view the facts in the
record in a manner most favorable to the findings of t~
trial court and whereas here, the defendant-appellant faile
to establish his affirmative defense of lack of considerat:
either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, the ruJ:'
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of the trial court should be upheld.
SUMMARY
The Trial Court held, and the record clearly shows,
that the plaintiff-respondent gave legally sufficient consideration to the defendant-appellant in exchange for
$7,500.00.

The burden was on the defendant to show the

insufficiency of consideration, which burden was not met.
The Trial Court found all factual and legal issues in favor
of the plaintiff-respondent and that judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

_t:;_~

of June,

1978.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered

___d::__

copies of

the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Richard D. Bradford,
359 West Center Street, Provo, Utah, on this

!5jj} day

June, 1978.

ALAN RUDD
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